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Abstract
Previous studies of change blindness have suggested a distinction between detection and localisation of changes in a visual 
scene. Using a simple paradigm with an array of coloured squares, the present study aimed to further investigate differences 
in event-related potentials (ERPs) between trials in which participants could detect the presence of a colour change but not 
identify the location of the change (sense trials), versus those where participants could both detect and localise the change 
(localise trials). Individual differences in performance were controlled for by adjusting the difficulty of the task in real time. 
Behaviourally, reaction times for sense, blind, and false alarm trials were distinguishable when comparing across levels of 
participant certainty. In the EEG data, we found no significant differences in the visual awareness negativity ERP, contrary to 
previous findings. In the N2pc range, both awareness conditions (localise and sense) were significantly different to trials with 
no change detection (blind trials), suggesting that this ERP is not dependent on explicit awareness. Within the late positivity 
range, all conditions were significantly different. These results suggest that changes can be ‘sensed’ without knowledge of 
the location of the changing object, and that participant certainty scores can provide valuable information about the percep-
tion of changes in change blindness.
Keywords Change blindness · Sensing · Event-related potentials · Awareness
Introduction
Change blindness is a phenomenon in which changes to a 
visual scene are often missed (Rensink 2004; Simons and 
Levin 1997). To manipulate this in an experimental set-
ting, the change blindness paradigm typically consists of 
two images displayed in quick succession that are inter-
rupted by a blank screen or a distractor image. In some 
instances, the second image is identical to the first, and in 
others, some aspects will have changed. Participants are 
then asked to report if the trial contained a change or not. 
The complexity of these images varies across paradigms, 
ranging from coloured rectangles (Koivisto and Revonsuo 
2003) and coloured dots (Schankin and Wascher 2007), to 
facial expressions (Eimer and Mazza 2005), detailed visual 
scenes (Fernandez-Duque et al. 2003) and household objects 
(Busch et al. 2010). In all cases, although complete visual 
information is available, participants often fail to notice or 
identify changes.
Most versions of the change blindness paradigm ask par-
ticipants to detect the presence of a change across two image 
presentations, meaning that trials can only be categorised 
as one of four types: hit (or see trials), miss (or blind tri-
als), false alarm (FA), or correct rejection (CR), depending 
on whether the participant reports seeing a change. Several 
researchers have challenged the traditional view that vision 
must always be accompanied by a complete conscious visual 
experience, or the activation of complete internal representa-
tion of what we see (Rensink 2004; Fernandez-Duque and 
Thornton 2000), and subsequently suggested the possibility 
of further trial divisions in the change blindness paradigm. 
In an early experiment reported by Rensink (2004), partici-
pants were asked to indicate when they ‘thought’ that some-
thing had changed in a flicker paradigm, and again when 
they were certain that they could see the change. In a flicker 
paradigm, the original image and changed image are pre-
sented sequentially until the participant is able to detect the 
change (Rensink et al. 1997). Trials in which these responses 
had a time difference greater than 1 second were labelled 
as trials with a ‘significant duration of sensing’, where the 
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participant suspected a difference but was not confident in 
their perception of the change. Rensink (2004) termed the 
ability to detect a change without fully identifying it as sens-
ing, suggesting that this condition is both phenomenologi-
cally and perceptually distinct to the traditionally reported 
see condition.
Several other researchers have explored the possibility 
of an awareness condition that lies somewhere between 
the traditional see and blind dichotomy (Fernandez-Duque 
et al. 2003; Laloyaux et al. 2006; Thornton and Fernandez-
Duque 2001; Galpin et al. 2008; Busch et al. 2009; Ball 
and Busch 2015; Kimura et al. 2008; Hollingworth et al. 
2001). For example, Fernandez-Duque and Thornton (2000) 
found that the location of a change could be identified above 
chance level even when participants did not report seeing 
the change itself [but see Mitroff et al. (2002) and Laloyaux 
et al. (2006) for a discussion of these results]. Further, in 
Mitroff et al. (2004) participants were able to identify pre- 
and post-change object stimuli above chance level when 
they detected a change, as well as when they did not. The 
presence of a sense condition has, therefore, been suggested 
as evidence that change blindness may arise from a failure 
to compare two displays or images, rather than a failure to 
encode the visual information (Simons and Ambinder 2005; 
Hollingworth et al. 2001). Further, sense trials may occur 
when features of a changing object only reach a pre-attentive 
stage, and are not fully integrated at later stages of visual 
processing (Galpin et al. 2008; Busch et al. 2009).
Results from change blindness experiments using EEG 
appear to support this assertion. In previous EEG research, 
the trial types of see and blind are often distinguishable in an 
early visual attention component around 200–300 ms after 
the change onset at contralateral electrode sites, known as 
the N2pc (Luck and Hillyard 1994; Schankin and Wascher 
2007). The presence of an N2pc reflects the allocation of 
attention towards an attended object (Luck and Ford 1998), 
and the amplitude is increased for ‘aware’ stimuli (Schankin 
and Wascher 2007). However, the N2pc also been found 
for ‘unaware’ stimuli in a masking paradigm, and, there-
fore, does not necessarily represent conscious awareness of 
a change (Woodman and Luck 2003). It is, therefore, sug-
gested that the N2pc, in the context of change blindness, 
reflects processing that is necessary, but not sufficient, to 
facilitate conscious change detection (Schankin and Wascher 
2007; Busch et al. 2009).
There is also evidence that the amplitude of early visual 
components, such as P1 and N1, may be dependent on the 
awareness level of the participant during a change detection 
task, given that larger peaks are identified for stimuli occur-
ring in an attended location (Pourtois et al. 2006; Railo et al. 
2011; Luck and Ford 1998). However, not all change blind-
ness EEG studies succeed in replicating this effect (Koivisto 
and Revonsuo 2010).
In a similar time window to the P1/N1 complex (around 
200 ms), the visual awareness negativity (VAN), typically 
occurring at posterior electrode sites, is thought to indicate 
detection of a stimulus and be dependent on spatial attention 
(Koivisto et al. 2008, 2009; Wilenius and Revonsuo 2007). It 
has been suggested that the VAN is associated with phenom-
enal visual awareness and is present even when successful 
identification of a changed object is not achieved (Lamme 
2004; Busch et al. 2009).
VAN is often followed by later positive ERP at posterior 
electrode sites called the late positivity (LP) (Koivisto et al. 
2009). This overlaps with the P3 component, also peaking 
around 400 ms, and can also be referred to as such in the 
literature (Busch et al. 2009). In comparison to the VAN, the 
LP is associated with conscious aspects of task processing 
(Railo et al. 2011), and has been shown to correlate with par-
ticipants’ confidence in their responses (Eimer and Mazza 
2005) .
Several EEG papers have also identified differences 
between see, sense and blind conditions. In a comparison 
between trials in which the participants were able to detect a 
change and identify the object of the change (see), and those 
where they could detect a change but not name it (sense), 
Busch et al. (2010) found an increase in amplitude of the 
VAN. The same effect was found in a later LP ERP at pos-
terior electrodes. However, the N2pc peak was found only 
when participants could both detect and identify the change, 
and was not present when participants were change blind, 
or could not identify the object. The authors concluded that 
seeing a change is not simply a stronger version of sens-
ing a change, as the N2pc can be found for see trials but 
not sense trials. This supports the hypothesis of Rensink 
(2004) that seeing and sensing may be facilitated by separate 
mechanisms. Other studies have also found differences in 
ERP amplitudes when comparing see and sense (Fernandez-
Duque et al. 2003; Kimura et al. 2008; Busch 2013; Ball and 
Busch 2015), but the definition of sense trials varies across 
studies (Mitroff et al. 2002), leading to divergent results.
The main aim of the present study was to compare behav-
ioural and ERP effects for trials in which participants could 
report the presence of a change but not localise it (sense), 
versus those in which participants could report and localise 
the change correctly (localise). Specifically, we divided the 
visual display into quadrants, and asked participants to select 
the quadrant in which the change occurred. Our sense condi-
tion, therefore, requires registration of the change, but not 
necessarily knowledge of its location (Mitroff et al. 2002). 
Further, participants were asked to rate how confident they 
were in their responses at every trial, to distinguish between 
trial types (Galpin et al. 2008). We used a simple paradigm 
with an array of coloured squares (see Fig. 1).
As increased amplitudes in the N2pc and LP have pre-
viously been found in the see condition compared to the 
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blind condition, we hypothesised that we would replicate 
these findings (Railo et al. 2011). Although modulation of 
P1 amplitudes have been reported in some change detection 
paradigms (Busch et al. 2009; Pourtois et al. 2006), oth-
ers report no such effect (Eimer 2000; Turatto et al. 2002; 
Niedeggen et al. 2001), so our hypothesis was not directed. 
When comparing localise versus sense trials, we hypoth-
esised that we would find increased amplitudes in the VAN, 
LP, and N2pc for localise trials (Busch et al. 2010; Fernan-
dez-Duque et al. 2003).
A further aim of the study was to identify if sense trials 
are behaviourally different to blind or false alarm trials, as 
others have suggested (Fernandez-Duque et al. 2003; Galpin 
et al. 2008), or whether they can be explained by explicit 
mechanisms (Mitroff et al. 2002). If the sense condition 
(where participants can detect but not localise a change in 
coloured square) can be explained by participant pressing 
the incorrect response when they did not see a change, then 
reaction times for sense trials should be similar to blind tri-
als. Or, if sense can be explained by a liberal response crite-
ria, such that participants report seeing a change despite not 
being sure, then uncertain sense trials should have similar 
reaction times to false alarms. Using EEG measures of neu-
ral activity, as well as additionally asking participants to rate 
their confidence at each trial (Galpin et al. 2008), we aimed 
to distinguish between these distinct types of awareness.
Materials and methods
Participants
Twenty subjects (mean ± SD, age = 20 ± 5, 6 left handed, 
2 male) with no history of psychiatric or neurological dis-
orders participated in this EEG study. All participants were 
over the age of 18, had corrected-to-normal vision and were 
not colour blind (based on self-report). The experiment was 
approved by the University of Reading ethics committee 
(UREC: 17/03), and was conducted in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki (as of 2008). All participants gave 
informed consent to take part, including consent to share 
their anonymised data. Three participants were removed 
from the original sample size of 23 for having less than 200 
usable trials after pre-processing (out of a maximum of 250 
trials). Trials were classified as unusable if they contained 
muscle or eye-movement artefacts that could not be removed 
during pre-processing.
Stimuli and presentation
Participants were presented with a change blindness task 
using Psychtoolbox (Kleiner et al. 2007), on a 1920 × 1080 
LCD monitor with a 60 Hz refresh rate. Participants were 
seated comfortably on an armchair, at approximately 60cm 
away from the screen, alone, in a quiet room (Faraday cage) 
with constant dim light. They were asked to fixate on a cen-
tral fixation cross and identify changes between consecutive 
displays of coloured squares. These were interrupted by a 
short fixation display to facilitate the change blindness phe-
nomenon (see Fig. 1 for details on display durations). On 
change trials, one of the squares changed colour from the 
first to the second display. On no-change trials, the displays 
were identical. This was followed by two or three questions, 
depending on the participant’s response to the first question. 
Each participant completed 5 blocks of 50 trials, leaving a 
total of 250 trials. Within these trials, two-thirds contained a 
change in coloured square (165 trials), and the rest contained 
no change (85 trials).
Question 1 asked ‘Did you see a change?’ to which par-
ticipants could respond ‘yes’ or ‘no’ using a keyboard. Ques-
tion 2 asked participants to localise the change, based on a 
2 × 2 grid from top left to bottom right. Question 3 asked 
how certain participants were of their responses, ranging 
from ‘1: Very Uncertain’ to ‘4: Very Certain’. If partici-
pants responded ‘no’ change to question 1, they were moved 
straight to question 3. This decision was made as our hypoth-
eses did not relate to ‘implicit’ change detection, as reported 
in Fernandez-Duque and Thornton (2000), and removing 
Fig. 1  Illustration of the experimental paradigm. The number of 
squares presented varied from 2 to a maximum of 36. Question 1 
asked ‘Did you see a change?’ to which participants could respond 
‘Yes’ or ‘No’. Question 2 asked participants to localise the change, 
based on a grid from top left to bottom right. Question 3 asked how 
certain participants were of their responses, ranging from ‘1: Very 
Uncertain’ to ‘4: Very Certain’. If participants responded ‘no change’ 
to question 1, they were moved straight on to question 3
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this question allowed for a greater number of trials within 
the same period of time. Participants were asked to respond 
within a limit of 2 s for each question, and trials with any 
response missing were not included in further analysis (3.6 
± 2.9). Participants made their response on a keyboard, 
using their index and middle fingers of each hand.
Difficulty was modulated in real time by adding and 
removing two squares from the display, based on the 
assumption that more distractors increase task difficulty 
(Vogel et al. 2005). This was to prevent floor and ceiling per-
formance during the task as a result of individual differences 
(Luck and Vogel 2013), and optimise for performance rather 
than to establish specific individual thresholds. Performance 
over the previous two trials was used to update the current 
trial; two consecutive correct answers added two squares, 
two incorrect deducted two squares, and one correct and one 
incorrect resulted in no change. The decision to increase or 
decrease the number of squares was made using responses 
to the localisation question (Q 2), as we were specifically 
interested in controlling the number of sense and localise 
trials. The display was divided into a 6 × 6 grid of possible 
change locations, meaning that a maximum of 36 squares 
could be presented during each trial. The location of the 
change on each trial was random, but the change occurred 
an equal number of times on the left and right hemifield of 
the screen. The number of squares always changed by two, to 
balance the number on the left right hemifields of the screen, 
and all participants began the experiment with two squares 
presented. Each block began with the number of squares pre-
sented on the last trial of the previous block. As the colour of 
the squares was not related to our main hypotheses, we used 
seven default MATLAB colours: blue, cyan, yellow, green, 
white, red, and magenta (MathWorks, Inc., version 2016b).
Behavioural analysis
The trials in which a change occurred were divided into 
three conditions: blind (no change detection), localise 
(change detection and localisation), and sense (change 
detection without localisation). Trials in which no change 
occurred were divided into correct rejection (no change 
reported) and false alarm (change incorrectly reported). The 
number of false alarm trials was low, with a mean of 12.45 
trials (range 2–33, SD 0.65) and, therefore, EEG analysis 
comparing false alarm to sense trials was not possible. The 
percentage of false alarm trials was calculated in relation to 
the total number of no-change trials, whereas the percentage 
of sense trials was calculated in relation to the total number 
of change trials.
Detection accuracy for each participant was calculated 
based on the percentage of change trials in which they cor-
rectly detected a change. Localisation accuracy was calcu-
lated as the percentage of correctly detected changes where 
the localisation was also correct. We also recorded each 
participant’s mean and maximum difficulty scores, with the 
maximum referring the highest number of squares that were 
displayed to them during the experiment.
D’prime was calculated as a measure of participant 
response bias. This was calculated using the equation 
d = z(hit rate) − z(false alarm rate) (Stanislaw and Todorov 
1999), and is defined as the difference between the means 
of signal and noise distributions, normalised by the vari-
ance. Response bias, or criterion, was also calculated, where 
c = −0.5 × (z(hit rate) + z(false alarm rate)) (Stanislaw and 
Todorov 1999). c = 0 indicates no response bias to either 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ responses. c > 0 indicates a bias towards ‘no’ 
responses, with fewer hits and fewer false alarms. c < 0 indi-
cates bias towards ‘yes’, with more hits but also more false 
alarms. We expected that participants would display a range 
of response strategies.
One problem faced in identifying a sense condition is 
that it is difficult to distinguish these trials from false alarm 
trials, or those where participants press the wrong response 
key (Simons and Ambinder 2005; Mitroff et al. 2002). Ren-
sink (2004) found that reaction times for sense trials were 
shorter for change trials than no-change trials, meaning that 
participants were slower when they were simply making a 
false alarm. Galpin et al. (2008) also found greater certainty 
associated with sensing during change trials, compared to 
false alarms. We, therefore, compared reaction times across 
awareness conditions, as well as between levels of certainty. 
As trial numbers were low, ‘very uncertain’ and ‘uncertain’ 
responses were combined, and ‘certain’ and ‘very certain’ 
were combined. Each awareness condition, therefore, had 
two levels of certainty; for example, localise certain and 
localise uncertain.
EEG data acquisition
EEG data were recorded with a BrainVision EasyCap (Brain 
Products), with 64 passive electrodes including an IO chan-
nel, arranged according to the 10-10 layout. The reference 
electrode was placed at FCz and the ground at AFz. Imped-
ance was kept below 10 k Ω for all the EEG channels, and 
5 k Ω for the IO channel. EEG signals were recorded using 
BrainVision Recorder (Brain Products, version 1.20) at a 
sampling rate of 5000 Hz.
EEG pre‑processing
Raw EEG data were pre-processed using BrainVision Ana-
lyzer (Brain Products, version 2.1). The data were first 
downsampled to 500 Hz to reduce computation time, then 
filtered with a high-pass filter of 0.01 Hz to remove low-fre-
quency drift (Butterworth, second order). A low-pass filter 
of 50 Hz and a notch filter of 50 Hz were chosen to remove 
Experimental Brain Research 
1 3
line noise. Independent component analysis (ICA) was used 
to remove eye-movement artefacts (FastICA). Two compo-
nents were removed for each participant: one corresponding 
to eye-blinks and the other to lateralised eye-movements.
Further analysis was completed using EEGLab (Delorme 
and Makeig 2004). Trials were marked as outliers if any ERP 
value was greater than three standard deviations from the 
mean value of that ERP across all trials (using the MATLAB 
function ‘isoutlier’). Note that we only searched for outliers 
in the electrodes used for analysis (P07, P08, Cz, Pz, and 
CPz). Trials marked as containing outliers were excluded 
from further analysis (3.25 trials per participant ± 2.46), as 
well as those where a response to any question was not made 
within the response time (3.60 trials per participant ± 2.94).
Segments were then taken from − 200 to 7000 ms to 
include the whole trial, and baseline corrected using a mean 
of the data within − 200 to 0 ms, where 0 ms was the start of 
the first display of coloured squares (see Fig. 1). We chose 
the baseline period to be before the first display onset, rather 
than the second, as we were interested in visual ERPs that 
occurred in response to both the displays. It has also been 
suggested that ERPs in response to the first presentation of 
a stimuli are related to the subsequent perception of change 
(Pourtois et al. 2006).
EEG analysis
To identify the peaks of the visually evoked potentials (P1 
and N1), a grand average ERP was calculated across all con-
ditions and participants, as advised in Luck and Gaspelin 
(2017), from electrodes P07 and P08. From here, the peaks 
of interest were determined by identifying the local max-
ima/minima of the expected peaks, using the peak detection 
function in BrainVision Analyzer. The mean value within a 
window around the peak was used instead of the peak value, 
as the mean is more robust against noise (Luck 2014). A 
window of 40 ms around the mean was chosen as the appro-
priate window for visual ERPs P1 and N1. In relation to the 
first display onset, the first P1 was identified at 122 ms, and 
the first N1 at 212 ms. In relation to the second display onset, 
the second P1 was identified at 114 ms, and the second N1 
at 222 ms.
Based on the previous literature (Busch et al. 2010; Tseng 
et al. 2012; Fernandez-Duque et al. 2003), the N2pc was 
defined as the mean within 200–400 ms after the second 
display at occipital electrodes PO7 and PO8. Over central 
parietal electrodes Cz, CPz and Pz, the VAN was defined 
within a window of 130–330 ms after the second display, 
and the LP within a window of 400–600 ms. We used win-
dow sizes of 200 ms, defined a priori, in an attempt to be 
conservative given the large variation within the literature.
To assess how differences between early visual com-
ponents across detection conditions were reflected at each 
stimulus presentation, P1 and N1 amplitudes were compared 
in two separate 2 × 3 repeated measures ANOVAs, with 
display (first/second) and awareness (blind/localise/sense) as 
the independent variables. Differences across hemispheres in 
the N2pc were analysed with another 2 × 3 repeated meas-
ures ANOVA, with the independent variables of hemisphere 
(contralateral/ipsilateral) and awareness (blind/localise/
sense). Amplitudes of the VAN and the LP were compared 
in two separate repeated measures ANOVAs with awareness 
(blind/localise/sense) as the independent variable. Where 
Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated that the assumption 
had been violated, Greenhouse–Geisser correction was used. 
All post hoc comparisons were two tailed, and corrected 
for multiple comparisons using false discovery rate, where 
q = 0.05 (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995). Effect sizes are 
reported as partial eta squared for ANOVA, and repeated 
measures Hedge’s g for t tests (Lakens 2013).
To determine if the visual ERPs (P1 and N1) varied as a 
function of the task difficulty (the number of squares pre-
sented per trial) we correlated the single-trial P1 and N1 
amplitudes with the number of squares presented at each 
trial. To determine if the LP amplitude varied with par-
ticipant confidence, as previously suggested (Eimer and 
Mazza 2005), single-trial LP values were correlated with 
participant confidence ratings. For single-trial analysis, 
time courses were constructed for each participant from the 
single-trial values of each ERP, at each channel (7 ERPs, 
64 channels, 20 participants). Note that midline electrodes 
were not included in N2pc analysis, as the N2pc values were 
calculated as the difference between ipsilateral and contralat-
eral amplitudes, which by definition is not meaningful for 
electrodes on the midline. Each single-trial value was cal-
culated as the mean amplitude within the pre-defined ERP 
window at each trial. These values were baseline corrected 
by subtracting the mean of the trial from which they were 
selected. P values were corrected for multiple comparisons 




Accuracy for question 1, in which participants had to iden-
tify a change, had a mean of 49% (range 32–73%, SD 13). 
Accuracy for question 2, in which participants had to local-
ise the change, had a mean of 70% (55–87%, 8). The mean 
difficulty level given to each participant was 14 squares 
(10–18, 3), with the mean maximum difficulty experienced 
by each participant at 26 squares (20–36, 4). D’prime scores 
had a mean of 0.61 (0.74–1.64, 0.27). In a one-sample t test, 
D’prime was significantly different from zero, suggesting 
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that participants were able to distinguish between change 
and no-change trials t(19) = 19.293, p < 0.001 . Two par-
ticipants had a negative criterion, meaning that they had a 
response bias towards false alarms. All other participants 
had positive criterion, indicating a conservative response 
strategy ( 0.60 ± 0.42).
Mean difficulty did not correlate with detection 
accuracy ( r = −0.022, p = 0.928 ), location accuracy 
( r = 0.136, p = 0.566 ), or d’prime ( r = −0.229, p = 0.332 ), 
suggesting that the difficulty of the task did not influence 
task performance. Maximum difficulty also did not cor-
relate with detection accuracy ( r = 0.067, p = 0.779 ), 
location accuracy ( r = − 0.077, p = 0.748 ), or d’prime 
( r = − 0.148, p = 535).
Comparison of sense and false alarm trials
The percentage of false alarm trials ( 14.64% ± 11.35 ) was 
lower than the percentage of sense trials ( 30.31% ± 8.02 ) 
t(19) = − 7.107, p < 0.001, grm = 1.48 , suggesting that 
sense trials occurred more often than participants made 
false alarms. However, the percentage of false alarms was 
positively correlated with the percentage of sense trials 
( r = 0.527, p = 0.017 ). Therefore, participants with a more 
liberal response strategy who made more false alarms, also 
had more sense trials.
Reaction times for sense and false alarm trials were 
compared, to determine if sense trials were different to 
trials where the participant incorrectly reported a change 
during a no-change trial. Reaction times for all sense tri-
als ( 0.744 ± 0.149 s), regardless of certainty, were not sig-
nificantly different to false alarm trials ( 0.778 ± 0.179 s), 
t(19) = − 1.229, p = 0.234, grm = 0.193 . However, sense 
certain trials ( 0.619 ± 0.133 s) were significantly faster than 
false alarm trials, t(19) = − 4.741, p < 0.001, grm = 0.939 . 
Therefore, when participants were certain that a change 
occurred, they responded more quickly than when they were 
simply making a false alarm.
Reaction times for sense certain trials ( 0.619 ± 0.133 s) 
were also significantly faster than false alarm uncertain trials 
( 0.817 ± 0.211 s), t(19) = − 4.510, p < 0.001, grm = 1.081 . 
However, this may be explained by the general finding 
that, across all conditions, certain trials ( 0.628s ± 0.142 ) 
were faster than uncertain trials ( 0.849 ± 0.129 s), 
(t(19) = − 7.831, p < 0.001, grm = 1.563)
Comparison of sense and blind trials
Reaction times for sense trials ( 0.744 ± 0.149 s) were 
not significantly different to blind trials ( 0.731 ± 0.176 
s ) ,  t(19) = − 0.285, p = 779, grm = 0.082  .  Howeve r, 
reaction times for sense uncertain trials ( 0.801 ± 0.189 
s) were signif icantly slower than blind tr ials, 
(t(19) = 4.424, p < 0.001, grm = 0.373) . Therefore, on trials 
where the participant did not see the change (blind), they 
responded more quickly than when they suspected a change 
but could not provide additional information about it (sense).
Comparatively, reaction times for sense cer-
tain tr ials  (  0.619 ± 0.133 s)  were signif icantly 
faster than blind uncertain trials ( 0.860 ± 0.231 s), 
(t(19) = 4.424, p < 0.001, grm = 1.224) , which again may 
be explained by the fact that uncertain trials were slower 
over all conditions.
Comparison of blind trials and no‑change trials
Out of the 20 participants included in the analysis, 15 
were slower to respond when they were blind to the 
change, compared to no-change trials (75%). This differ-
ence in reaction times was not significant when compar-
ing all no-change trials ( 0.704 ± 0.167 s) to blind trials 
( 0.731 ± 0.176 s), (t(19) = −2.084, p = 0.051, grm = 0.143) . 
However, blind uncertain trials ( 0.860 ± 0.231 s) were sig-
nificantly slower than no-change trials ( 0.704 ± 0.167 s), 
(t(19) = 3.637, p = 0.002, grm = 0.718) . Therefore, despite 
being blind to the change, the presence of a change in the 
display increased reaction times, particularly for trials where 
the participant was uncertain.
EEG results
Single‑trial correlations
The purpose of this analysis was to check whether single-
trial ERPs varied as a function of difficulty, i.e. the number 
of squares presented on the screen during each trial. After 
correcting for multiple comparisons using FDR correction 
( q = 0.05 ), no significant correlations were found.
The second analysis was to test whether single-trial ERPs 
varied with the confidence ratings of the participants. Sev-
eral researchers have suggested that ERPs, particularly those 
in later time windows such as the LP, may be more influ-
enced by participant confidence in their response than by 
the level of conscious awareness (Koivisto and Revonsuo 
2003; Eimer and Mazza 2005). None of the tests were sig-
nificant, with all p > 0.34 . This result suggests that confi-
dence ratings were not directly correlated with single-trial 
ERP amplitudes.
P1 and N1
Overall, no significant differences were found between 
the three awareness conditions for either the P1 or N1 
(Fig. 2). For P1 amplitudes, the main effect of aware-
ness was not significant, F(1.473, 19) = 1.117, p = 0.338 , 
Experimental Brain Research 
1 3
휂2 = 0.056 . The main effect of display was also not sig-
ni f icant ,  F(1, 19) = 0.355, p = 0.558, 휂2 = 0.018 ,  nor 
was the interaction between awareness and display, 
F(1.80, 34.35) = 0.307, p = 0.305 , 휂2 = 0.060.
For the N1, the main effect of awareness was not 
significant, F(1.36, 19) = 3.534, p = 0.060 , 휂2 = 0.157 . 
The main effect of display was also not signifi-
c a n t ,  F(1, 19) = 0.209, p = 0.653, 휂2 = 0.011  ,  n o r 
was the interaction between awareness and display, 
F(1.87, 35.61) = 0.377, p = 0.675 , 휂2 = 0.019.
N2pc
In line with our hypothesis, there was a signifi-
cant main effect of awareness on N2pc amplitudes, 
F(2, 18) = 4.043, p = 0.026 , 휂2 = 0.175 (Fig.  3). There 
was also a significant main effect of hemisphere, 
F(1, 19) = 4.594, p = 0.045 , 휂2 = 0.195 , with a greater neg-
ativity in the contralateral hemisphere ( −2.89 ±3.97 휇V  ) 
than the ipsilateral ( −2.33 ±4.26 휇V  ). The interaction was 
not significant, F(2, 18) = 1.048, p = 0.361 , 휂2 = 0.052.
Post hoc pairwise comparisons across awareness lev-
els with a FDR-corrected threshold of p = 0.03 showed 
that blind ( −2.055 ±1.23 휇V  ) had a significantly smaller 
N2pc amplitude than localise localise, ( −2.941 ±1.80 휇V  ), 
t(19) = 2.340, p = 0.030, grm = 0.197 , and sense ( −2.847 
±1.19 휇V  ), t(19) = 2.525, p = 0.021, grm = 0.181 . How-
ever, sense and localise were not significantly different, 
t(19) = −0.283, p = 0.780, grm = 0.022.
Visual awareness negativity (VAN)
Confirming our hypothesis, there was a signifi-
cant main effect of awareness on the VAN (Fig.  4), 
F(1.374, 18) = 3.931, p = 0.046  ,  휂2 = 0.171 .  H o w -
ever, in post hoc pairwise compar isons across 
awareness levels with a FDR-corrected threshold 
of p = 0.04, blind ( −1.474 ±2.52 휇V  ) was not sig-
nificantly different to localise ( −2.167 ±3.09 휇V  ), 
t(19) = 2.158, p = 0.044, grm = 0.217 , or sense ( −1.961 
±1.92 휇V  ), t(19) = 1.950, p = 0.066, grm = 0.161 . Local-
ise and sense were also not significantly different, 
t(19) = 1.235, p = 0.232, grm = 0.062.
Late positivity (LP)
In support of our hypothesis, there was a significant 
main effect of awareness on LP amplitudes (Fig.  4), 
F(1.355, 8) = 7.000, p = 0.008 , 휂2 = 0.269 . In post hoc 
pairwise comparisons across awareness levels with a FDR-
corrected threshold of p = 0.048, blind (2.931 ±2.02 휇V  ) 
was significantly smaller in amplitude to both localise (3.905 
±2.53 휇V ), t(19) = − 3.094, p = .006, grm = 0.383 , and sense 
(3.591 ±2.40 휇V  ), t(19) = −2.193, p = 0.041, grm = 0.275 . 
Localise was also significantly greater in amplitude than 
sense, t(19) = 2.110, p = 0.048, grm = 0.118.
Fig. 2  ERP plot showing the 
mean of electrodes PO7 and 
PO8, for each awareness condi-
tion. Condition means for the 
values within the shaded time 
windows were used for ERP 
analysis
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Discussion
The main aim of this change blindness experiment was to 
distinguish between trials in which participants could both 
detect and localise a change in coloured square (localise), 
versus those in which they could only detect it (sense), or 
not detect it at all (blind). We found significant differences 
between blind trials and both sense and localise trials in 
the N2pc ERP. We also found that sense and localise were 
significantly different in the late LP window. Behaviourally, 
reaction time results allowed us to distinguish sense trials 
Fig. 3  ERP plot showing the 
mean of electrodes PO7 and 
PO8, for each awareness condi-
tion. Asymmetry was calculated 
by subtracting contralateral 
from ipsilateral waveforms. 
Condition means for the values 
within the shaded time window 
(200–400 ms after the second 
display) were used for N2pc 
analysis
Fig. 4  ERP plot showing a 
mean of electrodes Cz, CPz, 
and Pz, for each awareness 
condition. Condition means for 
the values within the shaded 
time window were used for 
ERP analysis. The first shaded 
area was used for the visual 
awareness negativity (130–330 
ms after the second stimulus), 
and the second shaded area 
was used for the late positivity 
(400–600 ms)
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from false alarm and blind trials, when taking participant 
certainty into account. Overall, our results suggest that the 
sense condition may be distinguishable from the traditional 
see condition, and that utilising participant confidence is a 
valuable method to distinguish between levels of awareness 
in change blindness.
EEG
Our results indicated a difference between sense and localise 
trials within the LP range, which were significantly different 
to each other, as well as to blind. An increased late positivity 
for change detected trials versus change blind trials is the 
most commonly reported finding within the EEG literature, 
and all of the papers considered in the review by Koivisto 
and Revonsuo (2010) report this finding. This may be due 
to the relatively large size of this ERP, peaking anywhere 
between 300 and 700 ms after a change stimulus and across 
large time windows.
While the earlier negativity, VAN, is typically thought to 
be associated with phenomenal consciousness, the later posi-
tivity is linked to access consciousness and greater subject 
report ability. The repeated finding that the LP can be signif-
icantly reduced by specific stimuli, such as non-targets and 
repeated stimuli, suggests that it is not a direct correlate of 
visual awareness (Koivisto and Revonsuo 2010). Instead, it 
is generally thought to reflect higher level or fully conscious 
aspects of task processing (Railo et al. 2011; Koivisto and 
Revonsuo 2003). It has also be shown that the LP correlates 
with confidence in participant responses (Eimer and Mazza 
2005). However, when correlating single-trial LP amplitudes 
with confidence ratings, we did not find a significant effect.
The majority of change blindness papers listed by 
Koivisto and Revonsuo (2010) reported enhanced negativity 
in the N1–N2 range (with the exception of Fernandez-Duque 
et al. 2003; Niedeggen et al. 2001). Busch et al. (2010) found 
that an N2pc was evoked only when the change was fully 
identified, and not in the sense or blind conditions. Based 
on this, they draw the conclusion that for sense trials, the 
change did not induce a shift in attention towards the loca-
tion of the change and, therefore, the features of the change 
were not available for further recognition. This is based on 
the assumption that the N2pc represents the allocation of 
attention towards the object of interest, which is supported 
by a number of previous studies (Luck and Ford 1998).
Contrary to this, we found that both awareness condi-
tions were significantly different to blind trials, indicating a 
shift in the allocation of attention for all identified changes, 
regardless of subsequent success/failure to localise. It may 
also be that sense trials elicited a shift in attention to the 
correct hemifield of change (and, therefore, subsequently 
an N2pc), but that it was not specific enough to determine 
whether the change occurred in the upper or lower field 
within that hemifield. Woodman and Luck (2003) also iden-
tified an N2pc for ‘unaware’ stimuli which were masked by 
object substitution masking, suggesting that the N2pc does 
not necessarily represent conscious awareness of changes 
(Woodman and Luck 2003). It is suggested, however, that 
the amplitude is increased for ‘aware’ stimuli (Schankin and 
Wascher 2007), which our findings support.
Other studies have reported a larger N2pc for more 
attention-demanding tasks (Luck and Hillyard 1994). It 
was, therefore, a concern before analysis that sense trials 
would occur more often when the task was more difficult 
and, therefore, that the N2pc would be larger for this condi-
tion as a result of uneven trial distribution. We found the 
opposite, however, with a smaller N2pc in the sense condi-
tion compared to the localise condition. We also found no 
significant correlation with the number of sense trials and 
the difficulty of task given to the participant, suggesting that 
the trial distribution was even enough to avoid this confound.
Although there was a main effect of awareness within the 
VAN at central parietal sites, the corrected post hoc tests 
were not significant, and only localise was significantly dif-
ferent to blind using an uncorrected threshold ( p = 0.044 ). 
In comparison, (Busch et al. 2010) were able to identify 
a VAN for their sense condition, compared to blind. The 
VAN is thought to be dependent on spatial attention, and 
requires both the location and identity of an object to be 
stored such that it is available for conscious report (Koivisto 
et al. 2008). As participants were not able to identify the 
location of change in our sense condition, this may explain 
the lack of significant VAN ERP. In another study (Koivisto 
et al. 2008), VAN was found to be reduced when partici-
pants were asked to keep their eyes fixated at the centre of 
the screen. This was the case in this experiment, which may 
also have contributed to the lack of significant finding within 
the VAN window.
Unlike previous findings from Pourtois et al., the ampli-
tude of the P1 during the first stimuli display was not influ-
enced by the level of awareness (Pourtois et al. 2006). In 
fact, no significant modulations of awareness were identi-
fied within either of the visual ERPs, P1 and N1, across 
either display, which fails to support previous findings that 
P1 amplitude during a visual display varies with attention 
(Wilenius and Revonsuo 2007) and identification of changes 
(Mathewson et al. 2009). One possible reason for this could 
be that the number of squares varied across trials, unlike 
other experiments where the number was fixed (Pourtois 
et al. 2006) and, therefore, possibly driven by inter-indi-
vidual differences in performance. However, when correlat-
ing single-trial P1 and N1 amplitudes with difficulty across 
time, no significant correlations were found, after correcting 
for multiple comparisons. This suggests that the amount of 
squares presented during each trial had no direct influence 
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on the amplitude of the P1 and N1 and, therefore, that it did 
not create an obvious confound in the data.
In a review of the ERP correlates of visual awareness, 
Koivisto and Revonsuo (2010) list a number of change 
blindness EEG studies that also failed to detect modulation 
of an early P1 peak (Eimer 2000; Koivisto and Revon-
suo 2003; Fernandez-Duque et al. 2003; Schankin and 
Wascher 2007; Turatto et al. 2002; Niedeggen et al. 2001), 
compared to two studies which did (Busch et al. 2010; 
Pourtois et al. 2006). One criticism of the change blind-
ness paradigm is that success relies on the participant pay-
ing attention to the first visual display, for the change to 
be integrated into the short-term memory and the change 
detected (Simons and Levin 1997). Attention levels, and 
perhaps ERPs, in response to the first display, may, there-
fore, have a large influence on the success of the following 
trial. We did not find any electrophysiological evidence for 
this occurring, as the amplitude of the P1 and N1 during 
the first visual display did not correlate with subsequent 
ERPs, or with performance. It may be, however, that this 
effect presented itself in a section of the EEG that was not 
analysed, or that the effect was not strong enough to detect 
across participants, some of whom may have been more 
vigilant than others.
The relationship between attention and awareness in 
change blindness is complex, and we did not attempt to 
explicitly dissociate the two in our paradigm. In fact, 
Koivisto and Revonsuo (2010) argue that the change blind-
ness paradigm is not optimal for investigating the relation-
ship between attention and awareness, as change detection 
is reliant on memory and, therefore, also on attention (given 
that attention facilitates working memory). It is very pos-
sible that attention directed towards a particular stimuli or 
region of the display increased the probability of detection, 
and enabled participants to localise the change successfully. 
As previously found, attention may be necessary but not 
sufficient for change detection; changes outside of the focus 
of attention are often missed, but change blindness can also 
occur for attended items (Levin and Simons 1997; O’Regan 
et al. 2000; Chetverikov et al. 2018).
In an attempt to define the independent roles of attention 
and awareness, Lamme (2004) hypothesised that attention 
does not determine which stimuli reach a conscious state, 
but facilitates explicit report of these stimuli. While a large 
amount of visual input reaches the point where conscious 
awareness could be achieved, this vulnerable visual experi-
ence is short-lived without accompanying attention. Con-
scious stimuli that are not attended to and, therefore, cannot 
be explicitly reported only achieve ‘phenomenal awareness’. 
This is defined as a non-cognitive form of seeing, independ-
ent of attention, that can contain information about many 
items in a visual scene (Lamme 2003, 2004). Similarities 
can, therefore, be drawn between phenomenal awareness and 
the sense condition in our experiment, where participants 
could not successfully report the location of a change. In 
contrast, stimuli that benefit from the protective mechanism 
of attention enter ‘access awareness’, and can be explicitly 
reported. It should also be noted that, within this framework, 
unconscious stimuli can never be reported, even if attended 
to.
Behavioural
One explanation for the presence of a sense condition in 
change blindness is that it reflects a liberal response cri-
teria, such that participants report seeing a change even 
though they were not certain that it occurred (Simons and 
Ambinder 2005). In other words, they make a ‘false alarm’ 
during change trials. If this is the case, then these trials may 
be similar in number to false alarm trials, where participants 
incorrectly report a change for identical displays where they 
could not have seen a change. We found that participants 
had a significantly higher percentage of sense trials than 
false alarm trials, suggesting that sense trials occurred more 
often. This finding cannot be explained by the fact that more 
trials contained a change, as the percentages were calculated 
in relation to the total number of change/no-change trials, 
respectively.
However, we also found a significant correlation between 
the percentage of sense and false alarm trials, suggesting 
that participants with a more liberal response strategy were 
more likely to report the presence of a change when they 
were not completely sure where the change occurred. To 
further compare sense and false alarm trials, we also exam-
ined reaction times. Although all sense trials combined were 
not significantly different to false alarms, sense certain trials 
were significantly faster. Therefore, sense trials where the 
participant was certain that they saw something change may 
be distinguishable from simple false alarms.
Another explanation for the sense condition is that it con-
tains trials for which the participant mistakenly reported a 
change, even though they were not aware of it. In this case, 
reaction times for sense trials should be similar to those 
for blind trials, particularly those where participants were 
uncertain of their responses. We found that sense uncertain 
trials were significantly slower than blind trials, suggesting 
that participants took longer to respond to trials where they 
suspected that something had changed, but were uncertain.
Previous studies have also reported that participants 
responded ‘no change’ more quickly for no-change trials, 
compared to change trials (Williams and Simons 2000; 
Mitroff et al. 2002). The participant’s response is the same 
in both trial types, but the presence of a change is different. 
This suggests that even when they fail to detect the change 
in a change trial, they take longer to respond. We, therefore, 
compared reaction times for no-change trials and blind trials. 
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Out of the 20 participants, 15 were slower to respond when 
they were blind to the change, compared to no-change trials 
(75%), which is higher than the 68% reported by Williams 
and Simons (2000). Although no significant differences were 
found between all blind and no-change trials, blind uncertain 
trials were significantly slower. It is possible that in blind 
certain trials, no information about the change is registered 
by the participant and, therefore, reaction times are similar 
to no-change trials. However, in blind uncertain trials, some 
information may be available to the participant, leading to 
slower reaction times, but not enough for them to be confi-
dent to report the change.
As the average accuracy for question 1 (yes/no) was 
roughly 50% across participants, change trials were fairly 
equally divided into see (all trials where a change was cor-
rectly identified) and blind conditions. Within the see trials, 
accuracy for question 2 (‘where did the change occur?’) was 
roughly 70%, leaving more trials in the localise condition 
than the sense condition.
Unfortunately, the number of false alarm trials was low, 
meaning that a comparison of false alarms trials in the EEG 
data was not possible. Within the sense trials, there was also 
a low number of ‘certain’ trials, meaning that dividing the 
awareness conditions into certain/uncertain for EEG analy-
sis was also not possible. Future experiments could focus 
on obtaining higher trial numbers, which would hopefully 
facilitate this analysis. However, the very nature of the sense 
condition means that participants are unlikely to be ‘certain’ 
during many of the trials.
We defined the difficulty of the task as the number of 
squares that were presented to the participant during each 
trial. Participants ranged in the difficulty within which they 
could perform the task with similar accuracy. The maxi-
mum difficulty ranged from 10 to 36, with only one partici-
pant reaching the highest possible level. The fact that the 
difficulty measures, such as maximum difficulty and mean 
difficulty, were not correlated with accuracy or d’prime, sug-
gests that the difficulty modulation managed to control for 
individual differences in ability across participants. How-
ever, despite the difficulty modulation, the range of accuracy 
demonstrated by the participants was large (32–73%). Future 
studies could benefit from a more sophisticated measure of 
trial-by-trial adaptation, to further balance the number trials 
within each condition and participant.
Conclusions
Overall, the main aim of this experiment was to identify 
neural differences between full and partial awareness of col-
our changes, while controlling for individual differences in 
performance. Behaviourally, reaction time results allowed 
us to distinguish sense trials from false alarm and blind tri-
als, when taking participant certainty into account. For EEG 
data in the N2pc range, localise and sense were both signifi-
cantly different to blind trials, but not significantly different 
from each other. In comparison, within the LP range, all 
conditions were significantly different, indicating that the 
difference between levels of awareness was represented in 
this late potential. Overall, our results suggest that the sense 
condition may be distinguishable from the traditional see 
condition, and that utilising participant confidence is a valu-
able method to distinguish between levels of awareness in 
change blindness.
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